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Contemporary and Comparative Perspectives 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Introduction 
Steven J. Gunn* 
As the United Nations and its member states observe the second 
International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People,1 native 
peoples around the world are struggling to protect their aboriginal 
homelands, natural resources, distinctive cultures, languages, 
religions, and ways of life. The aboriginal peoples of Australia are 
fighting for recognition, demarcation, and, in some cases, restoration 
of their traditional lands. The First Nations of Canada are asserting 
claims to fish, wildlife, and other natural resources on and off their 
tribal lands. The Hopi and Zia Pueblo of the American Southwest are 
fighting to preserve their unique cultural heritages and traditions and 
to protect their cultural and intellectual property from unwanted 
appropriation and dissemination. These and other indigenous peoples 
are fighting for recognition and preservation of rights and resources 
essential to their survival and prosperity.  
 * Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law.  
 1. See G.A. Res. 59/174 (Dec. 20, 2004). The first Decade of the World’s Indigenous 
People took place from 1995 to 2004. The second began in 2005 and will expire at the end of 
2014. The purpose of these decades is to draw the attention of the United Nations and its 
member states to the unique circumstances of the world’s indigenous peoples. In 1994, the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights’ Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities prepared a Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. See U.N. Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of 
Minorities, Comm’r for Human Rights, Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES.1994.45 (1994) [hereinafter Draft 
Declaration]. This document sets forth far-reaching protections for indigenous autonomy, 
property rights, and cultural heritage, among other things. It is still under consideration by the 
Commission on Human Rights and has yet to be adopted as a convention (or other binding 
instrument) by the member states of the U.N.  
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Indigenous peoples engage in these struggles not as individuals, 
but as nations. Worldwide, indigenous peoples are asking to be 
recognized as autonomous states with their own governments, legal 
systems, and laws. Indeed, many indigenous peoples believe that 
their survival as distinct societies is dependent on their right of tribal 
self-determination. In its strongest form, this right allows indigenous 
peoples to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social, and cultural development.”2 Self-
determination ensures that indigenous peoples have the right to 
govern themselves, free from outside interference and control.  
Indigenous claims for self-determination have been met with 
strong resistance. Historically, non-Indian nation states have asserted 
claims of dominance over the indigenous societies, lands, and 
resources within their borders. Many states remain unwilling to 
recognize indigenous peoples as self-governing nations. Those that 
do acknowledge tribes as separate sovereigns have limited the reach 
of the tribes’ inherent powers to internal affairs, often leaving tribes 
without the ability to regulate the activities and property of non-
Indians living on or passing through their tribal territories. Powerful 
economic interests oppose restoration of traditional tribal land bases 
and recognition of expansive tribal rights to natural resources. 
Indigenous claims of collective rights to land and resources are 
perceived as threats to non-Indian economic prosperity and social 
stability. It is against this resistance that indigenous peoples labor to 
preserve their autonomy and distinct ways of life.  
This symposium presents several contemporary and comparative 
perspectives on the rights of indigenous peoples in Canada, Australia, 
the United States, and elsewhere, and the challenges indigenous 
peoples face as they champion their rights to self-determination, land, 
natural resources, and cultural property.  
CANADA 
In his article, John Borrows (Anishinabe/Chippewa) addresses the 
indigenous legal traditions and contemporary rights of indigenous 
peoples in Canada. A distinctive feature of the Canadian approach to 
 2. Draft Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/12
p155 Gunn book pages.doc  3/7/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  Introduction 157 
 
 
 
Indian law is its recognition of the aboriginal rights of indigenous 
peoples to, among other things, their traditional lands and natural 
resources. In its Constitution Act of 1982, Canada “recognized and 
affirmed” the “existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal 
peoples of Canada.”3 In so doing, Canada gave legal protection to 
aboriginal rights that derived not from treaties (or statutes and 
executive orders), but from the Indian’s historic and traditional 
patterns of land and resource use. Since 1982, Canada’s First Nations 
have successfully asserted their aboriginal rights to land and natural 
resources.4 By contrast, no such protection of aboriginal rights exists 
under the United States Constitution.5 
Despite its progressive recognition of certain aboriginal rights, 
Canada generally does not recognize the inherent sovereignty or right 
to self-government of its First Nations. Borrows notes that, with few 
exceptions, affairs in Indian country are governed by the “Indian Act 
and other non-indigenous bodies under federal creation, [exercising] 
delegated and ministerial authority.” Under the Indian Act, originally 
passed in 1876, “traditional Indian governments were replaced by 
band councils that function as agents of the federal government, 
exercising a limited range of delegated powers under close federal 
supervision.”6 Band councils may pass laws concerning local matters, 
but these laws must be consistent with the Indian Act and federal 
regulations.7 
 3. See Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, Constitution Act, 1982, pt. II, Canada 
Act, 1982, ch. 11, sched. B § 35(1) (U.K.); Constitutional Conference, § 37, Constitution Act, 
1982, pt. IV.  
 4. See, e.g., Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.R. 1010; Sparrow v. R., 
[1990] S.C.R. 1075.  
 5. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 285 (1955) (holding that 
“Indian occupation of land without government recognition of ownership creates no rights 
against taking or extinction by the United States protected by the Fifth Amendment or any other 
principle of law”).  
 6. Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States 
Policy Toward Indians, 66 WASH. L. REV. 643, 688 (1991). 
 7. Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 
45 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1322 (1993). Not all First Nations are subject to the Indian Act. Some 
have negotiated treaties or agreements taking them outside the scope of the Act, either in whole 
or in part, and allowing them to exercise inherent powers of self-government. See, e.g., Nisga’s 
Final Agreement Act, 2000 S.C., ch. 7 (Can.); Yukon First Nations Self-Government Act, 1994 
S.C., ch. 35 (Can.); Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act, 1986 S.C., ch. 27 (Can.); Cree-
Naskapi (of Quebec) Act, 1984 S.C., ch. 18 (Can.). 
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With few exceptions, Canada’s First Nations do not have their 
own constitutions or courts.8 Tribal disputes and claims are resolved 
in non-Indian courts that often fail to apply indigenous norms or legal 
principles. Moreover, indigenous peoples are generally subject to the 
laws and regulations of the provinces in which they are located. Most 
Commentators describe the governing powers of First Nations as 
“minimal” and “almost symbolic.”9 In this context, Borrows suggests, 
indigenous legal traditions “have often been ignored or overruled.” 
Borrows makes a compelling case for recognition and 
reaffirmation of the inherent sovereignty and right to self-government 
of Canada’s First Nations. He suggests that the right to self-
government ought to be recognized as one of the “existing aboriginal 
. . . rights” already affirmed to Canada’s “aboriginal peoples” under 
the Constitution Act of 1982. In Borrows’ view, indigenous peoples 
should be freed from the stranglehold of the Indian Act. They must 
be permitted to draw upon their unique cultures and norms to develop 
their own constitutions, councils, courts, laws, and legal systems, free 
from provincial interference or control, and to exercise inherent, not 
delegated, powers. This, he says, would increase the legitimacy and 
accountability of tribal governments “by placing decision-making 
authority much closer to the people within [indigenous] 
communities” and by allowing First Nations to exercise “greater 
responsibility for their own affairs.”  
For Borrows, “greater recognition of indigenous governments and 
dispute resolution bodies” is consistent with Canada’s longstanding 
commitment to legal pluralism. Historically, Canada has embraced 
both civil and common law traditions. Now, says Borrows, it must 
embrace and incorporate indigenous legal traditions.  
 8. Even Nunavut, the territory formed as a result of Canada’s 1993 land claim settlement 
with the Inuit people, is part of the Canadian federal government. It is not a distinct tribal 
government. Elections are open to all residents of the territory, regardless of their tribal 
affiliation, and territorial laws are subject to the overriding control of the federal government. 
See Nunavut Act, 1993 S.C., ch. 28 (Can.); Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act, 1993 S.C., 
ch. 29 (Can.). 
 9. Jean M. Silveri, A Comparative Analysis of the History of United States and Canadian 
Federal Policies Regarding Native Self-Government, 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 618, 
656 (1993).  
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AUSTRALIA 
In Australia, as in Canada, indigenous peoples have asserted 
successful claims for the return of their aboriginal lands. In the 1992 
case of Mabo v. Queensland,10 the Australian High Court rejected the 
historic doctrines of discovery and terra nullius, and recognized 
aboriginal peoples’ claims to their traditional homelands. Yet, as Lisa 
Strelein details in her symposium contribution, developments in the 
Australian courts and legislature since Mabo have rendered native 
title “inherently fragile.” According to Strelein, it has become 
increasingly difficult for Australia’s aboriginal peoples to assert 
claims of exclusive land ownership over their native lands. In 
addition, the Australian government has consistently rejected 
aboriginal claims to sovereignty or self-government over their 
territories. Taken together, these dynamics have severely limited the 
ability of Australia’s indigenous peoples to control their own 
destinies. Strelein is careful not to minimize the importance of the 
Australian High Court’s landmark decision in Mabo. The decision, 
she notes, was based on progressive notions of “justice and human 
rights,” and in many ways, it presaged important developments in 
international law recognizing the validity of aboriginal Indian title.11  
However, Strelein notes that despite its potential, Mabo contained 
the seeds of its own undoing. The decision recognized the power of 
the Australian Parliament to extinguish native title by positive 
 10. (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.  
 11. A number of recent international cases have recognized the legitimacy of aboriginal 
title. For example, in Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights upheld the 
aboriginal land rights of the Awas Tingni Indians in Nicaragua. The court ordered Nicaragua to 
retract logging concessions it had granted on Awas Tingni indigenous lands and further ordered 
the state to demarcate and legally secure the lands customarily used and occupied by the Awas 
Tingni. Similarly, in Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 
12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, (Oct. 24, 2003), the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights found that Belize violated the human rights of the Maya Indians by granting 
logging concessions over traditional Maya territories. The Commission found that indigenous 
property rights, “are not limited to those property interests that are already recognized by states 
or that are defined by domestic law, but rather that the right to property has an autonomous 
meaning in international human rights law . . . [T]he property rights of indigenous peoples are 
not defined exclusively by entitlements within a state’s formal legal regime, but also include 
that indigenous communal property that arises from and is grounded in indigenous custom and 
tradition.” Id. ¶ 117. 
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legislative enactment. Since Mabo, the Australian courts have found 
native title rights to be extinguished, in whole or in part, by 
legislative grants to non-Aborigines of pastoral leases, freehold 
estates, and fee simple estates on native lands. Similarly, grants of 
subsurface mining rights, the establishment of public works on native 
lands, and other exercises of sovereign power inconsistent with 
aboriginal ownership can operate to extinguish native title.  
Australian aboriginal peoples face an additional hurdle in 
establishing their native title rights. The Native Title Act, passed the 
year after Mabo was decided, requires aboriginal claimants to prove 
that they have existed continuously, from the time of assertion of 
Crown sovereignty to the present, as distinct societies with 
continuous and substantially uninterrupted customary connections to 
the lands they claim. Strelein notes that these requirements are 
susceptible to varying interpretations and can be manipulated to deny 
indigenous land claims.  
Strelein makes the case for greater protection of native title and 
greater recognition of aboriginal societies’ rights to sovereignty over 
their peoples and newly-recognized territories. In respect to 
aboriginal sovereignty, Strelein notes that, to date, “the courts have 
refused to hear argument on the continuing sovereignty of Indigenous 
peoples” in Australia. This must change, she says, if Australia’s 
indigenous peoples are to realize their goal of meaningful self-
determination.  
UNITED STATES 
In the United States, Indian tribes are recognized as “self-
governing political communities”12 that possess “attributes of 
sovereignty over both their members and their territory.”13 Although 
they are politically dependent on the United States, “Indian tribes still 
possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or 
statute, or by implication as a result of their dependent status.”14 
Unlike their counterparts in Canada and Australia, American Indian 
 12. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985).  
 13. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).  
 14. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).  
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tribes exercise inherent powers of self-government. Generally, they 
have the right “to make their own laws and be governed by them.”15 
They have their own constitutions, governments, courts, legal 
systems, and land bases.  
Despite this, American Indian tribes are subject to the overriding 
power of the national government. Congress asserts “plenary 
authority over the tribal relations of Indians.”16 In the exercise of that 
authority, Congress has repeatedly enacted legislation regulating the 
internal affairs of Indian tribes. In addition, Congress has delegated to 
the Secretary of the Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 
the power to oversee many, if not most, aspects of tribal governance.  
The curious juxtaposition between federal plenary power and 
tribal sovereignty led one Supreme Court Justice to describe federal 
Indian law as “schizophrenic.”17 According to this Justice: “[F]ederal 
Indian law is at odds with itself . . . . The Federal Government cannot 
simultaneously claim power to regulate virtually every aspect of the 
tribes through ordinary domestic legislation and also maintain that 
the tribes possess anything resembling ‘sovereignty.’”18 
In his article, Matthew L.M. Fletcher (Ottowa/Chippewa) 
powerfully illustrates this incoherence in U.S. Indian law. He notes 
that Congress has routinely “unilaterally abrogate[d] treaties and 
take[n] tribal property with little or no compensation.” But the 
primary focus of Fletcher’s attention is not Congress, but the 
administrative bureaucracy charged with the everyday management 
of Indian affairs. Fletcher argues that the BIA “has its tentacles all 
over every Indian tribal government,” and that it routinely “seeks to 
persuade, coerce, intimidate, or otherwise force” to act in accordance 
with federal desires. For Fletcher, bureaucratic interference with the 
ability of American Indian tribes to determine their own affairs is 
among the most “insidious” forms of modern colonialism. 
Fletcher cites numerous examples of this interference: federal 
influence and control over the ability of tribes to define their own 
membership; bureaucratic meddling in, and influence over the 
 15. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).  
 16. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). 
 17. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 18. Id. at 225.  
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outcome of, tribal elections; the refusal of the Secretary of the 
Interior to place off-reservation Indian lands into federal trust status; 
and BIA mismanagement of tribal trust funds.  
Fletcher argues that in these and other ways, the federal 
government’s control over Indian affairs undermines tribal self-
government and self-determination. He advocates greater coherence 
in U.S. Indian law through federal recognition of tribal sovereignty 
and self-government free from federal domination and control.  
Fletcher’s article, like those of Borrows and Strelein, highlights a 
common feature in the experience of indigenous peoples worldwide: 
the reluctance of non-Indian nation states to recognize and affirm the 
full right of indigenous peoples to exist as sovereign independent 
nations. In the United States, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere, 
indigenous peoples challenge that reluctance, pursuing claims for 
greater powers of self-government, while at the same time struggling 
to defend their collective group rights to land, resources, and cultural 
integrity.  
CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Contemporary Indian struggles concern not just real property and 
natural resources, but cultural and intellectual property as well. In 
their article, Lorie Graham and Stephen McJohn stress the 
importance to indigenous peoples around the world of preserving and 
protecting their cultural property and traditional knowledge. Such 
property and knowledge are the cornerstones of tribal cultures. They 
are also vital to the realization of tribal self-determination. For 
example, tribal values and beliefs are embedded in the sacred songs 
and dances of the Hopi Indians of the American Southwest, the 
exquisite artwork of Australian aboriginal peoples, the sun symbol of 
the Zia Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, and the traditional knowledge 
of medicinal plants of the Indian communities in Mexico. These 
sacred songs, dances, artworks, and knowledge “must be learned and 
renewed by each succeeding generation of indigenous children.”19 
 19. Erica Irene-Daes, U.N. Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of 
Minorities, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E.97/XIV.3 
(1997). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/12
p155 Gunn book pages.doc  3/7/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  Introduction 163 
 
 
 
They must also be protected from unauthorized acquisition and 
dissemination.  
Noting the vulnerability of indigenous cultural property and 
traditional knowledge to commercial exploitation, Graham and 
McJohn advocate the application of firmly defined intellectual 
property rights and “intellectual property protection for indigenous 
cultures.” Their position is similar to that articulated in the Draft U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: “Indigenous 
peoples are entitled to the recognition of the full ownership, control 
and protection of their cultural and intellectual property.”20 
In advocating this position, Graham and McJohn respond to 
anthropologist Michael F. Brown, who suggests in his book, Who 
Owns Native Culture?, that modern intellectual property rights are ill-
suited to protect tribal cultural property, and that instead of 
attempting to create new forms of property rights, indigenous peoples 
should strive to negotiate meaningful compromises with non-Indians 
who seek to acquire their property and knowledge. For Brown, 
negotiation based on mutual respect for indigenous culture is the 
ideal, not “rights talk.”  
Graham and McJohn believe that existing (or perhaps slightly 
modified) intellectual property laws can, indeed, be used to protect 
indigenous cultural property: native songs, dances, and artwork can 
be copyrighted; native symbols can be trademarked; and processes 
used to make traditional medicines can be patented. While they share 
Brown’s desire for negotiation and mutual respect, Graham and 
McJohn believe that firm property rights are essential prerequisites 
for meaningful negotiations with outsiders. Graham and McJohn 
argue—as have others21—that such rights are necessary to ensure the 
equal bargaining strength of indigenous peoples. This, in turn, will 
guarantee respect for indigenous interests.22  
In the end, for Graham and McJohn, intellectual property law can 
play a key role in safeguarding indigenous cultures. Firmly 
 20. Draft Declaration, supra note 1, art. 29. 
 21. See, e.g., Carol Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places?, 114 YALE L.J. 991 (2005).  
 22. Graham and McJohn do not share Brown’s concern that the recognition of indigenous 
intellectual property rights will result in a significant withdrawal of indigenous cultural property 
and knowledge from the public domain. Thus, they see no need for measures to dilute 
indigenous intellectual property rights. 
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established rights help ensure that indigenous people are in control of 
negotiations concerning the use and dissemination of their cultural 
property and traditional knowledge.  
INTERNATIONAL BORDERS AND BEYOND 
Complex negotiations of a different sort are required for 
indigenous peoples whose traditional homelands are divided by 
international borders. For these peoples, the right “to maintain and 
develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including activities for 
spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with other 
peoples across borders,”23 is essential. Indigenous peoples prefer a 
regime in which they can exercise this right, free from outside 
regulation or control. Yet, this preference is tempered by the desire of 
indigenous peoples to prevent the illegal trafficking by non-Indians 
and others of people, drugs, and contraband across international 
borders. To police their borders effectively, indigenous peoples often 
must work in close collaboration with state officials. Just as often, 
they must recognize the authority of federal and state officials to 
regulate border crossings and prosecute criminal conduct occurring 
on tribal lands. 
In the final article of the symposium, Eileen Luna-Firebaugh 
(Choctaw/Cherokee) describes the efforts of one Indian tribe, the 
Tohono O’odham Nation of Arizona, to work together with the 
United States and the State of Arizona to police the tribe’s border 
with Mexico, while at the same time preserving the tribe’s right of 
passage across the border at traditional crossing points.  
The Tohono O’odham Nation is one of twenty-four Indian nations 
in the United States whose reservations are located on or near the 
U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico. Together, these twenty-four 
reservations straddle over 260 miles of the United States’ 
international borders. The Tohono O’odham Nation shares a seventy-
five-mile border with Mexico. It is estimated that every year 10,000 
or more undocumented immigrants cross (or attempt to cross) the 
U.S.-Mexican border on Tohono O’odham lands. These immigrants 
threaten to imperil the safety and quality of life of the Tohono 
 23. Draft Declaration, supra note 1, art. 35.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/12
p155 Gunn book pages.doc  3/7/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  Introduction 165 
 
 
O’odham people. Trafficking in drugs and other forms of contraband 
is commonplace, as is the degradation of environmentally protected 
and sacred land. Under U.S. law, the Tohono O’odham Nation lacks 
criminal jurisdiction over the conduct of non-Indians, including 
undocumented immigrants. Thus, to patrol their border, the Tohono 
O’odham people must collaborate with state and federal officials.  
According to Luna-Firebaugh, in 2004, the Tohono O’odham 
Nation, the United States, and the State of Arizona came together to 
form the Arizona Border Control Initiative. This initiative strives to 
patrol the Arizona-Mexico border and apprehend non-tribal members 
attempting to cross illegally over Tohono O’odham (and other) lands. 
Federal officials have broad authority to apprehend and prosecute 
undocumented immigrants and criminals on Tohono O’odham lands. 
At the same time, care is taken to protect the Tohono O’odham 
peoples’ rights of passage across the border for traditional purposes. 
Initiatives like this, and the compromises they represent, are essential 
to the preservation of traditional rights of passage in the modern 
world.  
Taken together, the contributions to this symposium illustrate the 
complex challenges facing indigenous peoples in the twenty-first 
century. They also demonstrate with clarity the value inherent in 
recognizing indigenous peoples as distinct sovereigns with secure 
rights to their lands, natural resources, cultural property, and self-
government.  
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